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Article 5

Commentary

Industrial Site Selection:
Existing Institutions and
Proposals for Reform
The Final Report of the ABA Special Committee
on Environmental Law
I. INTRODUCTION
As this country's technological and industrial complex continues
at its exponential rate of growth, new and greater demands are
constantly being placed on the environment and our natural
resources. Recent environmental concern has been drawn to the
problem of industrial expansion as it relates to those natural
resources traditionally considered "free," such as waterways and
airsheds. Because the marginal value to any one additional user
of these "free" resources is close to zero, there has been little incentive to establish a system of planning and allocation designed to
force users to internalize the social costs of such uses. However,
as the sources of society's polluters continue to multiply, these "free"
resources are likely to become overloaded and will acquire an everincreasing worth.'
The inevitable increasing conflict between industrial growth and
environmental preservation makes the need for comprehensive land
use regulation and industrial site control even more apparent.
While, traditionally, the value of technological growth has been
assessed without serious concern for consequences such as social or
ecological detriment, as modern understanding regarding the complex relationship between pollution and the environment develops,
traditional concepts begin to break down. Today it is recognized
that industrial growth and environmental preservation are not
bifurcated values, but instead are inherently interrelated. The
traditional choice between development and the environment is
1. A.

KNEESE, R. AYERS & R. D'ARGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
A MATERIALS BALANCE APPROACH 13-14 (1970). See also Tarlock, Tippy
& Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing
and Proposed Institutions,45 S. CAL. L. REv. 502 (1972).
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now being reformed by decisions based upon balancing of ecological
and developmental alternatives.
Most states do not currently possess comprehensive environmental legislation designed to facilitate industrial site selection
pursuant to a program of general land use controL2 However,
even where such legislation exists, it has generally proven to be
inadequate to handle complex environmental and developmental
problems because of hopeless inter-agency fragmentation and procedural overlap or delay. 3
In recognition of the inadequacy of existing regulatory structures and the need for comprehensive land use regulation and
industrial site control, the Special Committee on Environmental
Law of the American Bar Association undertook a three year study
which culminated in its final report, entitled "Development and the
Environment: Legal Reforms to Facilitate Industrial Site Selection."'4 The report outlines proposals for administrative reform of
existing regulatory structures at both the federal and state level
so as to better provide for industrial site selection pursuant to the
overall public interest. A resolution approving in principle the
final report of the Special Committee was adopted by the American
Bar Association at its annual meeting in August, 1974.
This article will examine in detail the ABA Committee report
in relation to currently existing governmental structures for environmental regulation. Present law at both the federal and state
level will first be discussed, focusing on those governmental institutions which have a direct impact on industrial site selection. Next,
there will be a discussion of both the procedural and substantive
aspects of the Committee reform proposals. Finally, conclusions
will be drawn and recommendations made with respect to specific
Committee proposals and existing institutional needs.
II.

STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION

Mechanisms for regulating industrial siting at the state level
currently range from little or no regulation to comprehensive
environmental and land use regulatory controls. Although almost
one-fourth of all states have enacted comprehensive legislation
2. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text infra.
3. Comprehensive environmental legislation facilitating industrial site
selection has been enacted by the federal government and by several
state governments. See notes 11-26 and accompanying text infra.
4. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT:
TION

LEGAL REFORMS TO FACILITATE INDUSTRIAL SITE SELEC-

(Final Report 1974) [hereinafter cited as

REPORT].
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which in some way brings them into active participation in the siting of industrial facilities, a majority have no such direct administrative program. 5 The critical need for legislation reform of current procedures for land use and industrial siting regulation
becomes apparent after looking at a summary of existing state
regulations."
In those states which have no comprehensive system for land
use regulation, existing institutional arrangements are generally
not equipped to balance the growing demand for industrial growth
with environmental preservation. Consequently, numerous state
agencies make environmental decisions in a piecemeal fashion. In
some states, problems arise because several agencies have concurrent jurisdiction, and this results in administrative duplication and
"instant veto power."' In other instances, a lack of agency authority, manpower or funds causes slipshod administration. The cumulative result is a general lack of comprehensive decision-making
which causes delay and failure in adequately integrating and reflecting overall state policy.
Even in states where a single agency is responsible for construction certification,8 environmental values are often not adequately
protected. Most do not have a program for long-range planning
which realistically predicts and plans for future industrial expansion and power consumption; therefore, as consumer needs become
critical, the result is often an "all or nothing" industry construction proposal which compromises environmental values. To complicate the problem many states do not require pre-construction cer5.

ABA

SPECIAL COiMI. ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE DEcISION-MAKING PROCESS IN INDUSTRIAL SITE SELECTION 3-2 (Review Draft

1973) [hereinafter cited as REviEW DRAFT].

6. This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of
current state regulatory schemes, but is rather a brief summary of
current legislation designed to illustrate the existing problems in industrial site selection. See generally Van Baalen, Industrial Siting
Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and
Siting Act-Advance or Retreat?, 11 LAND & WATER LAW REv. 27
(1976); Best, Recent State Initiatives on Power Plant Siting: A Report
and Comment, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 668 (1972); REVIEW DRAFT,

supra note 5.
7. "Instant veto power" occurs when several agencies have overlapping
licensing jurisdiction concerning one industrial project. One agency
in its sole discretion can "veto" the development by refusing to grant
a license, even though the project may prove beneficial to the overall
state interest.
8. An example of a single state agency with preemptive licensing authority would be a state power commission having regulatory jurisdiction
over the certification of electrical generating facilities.
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tification.0 As a result, industry can invest great sums of money and
inflict substantial environmental harm before an "objective"
evaluation of the project is made. Finally, environmental preservation may not even play a significant role in the decisionmaking of various state regulatory agencies, since they often have
no legislative guidelines and traditionally have been primarily
oriented toward short range goals such as maintaining reliable production and cheap power supplies.1 0
Within the past few years several states have taken the initiative
and adopted comprehensive environmental legislation designed to
The
facilitate site selection for major industrial developments.'
statutory provisions which have been adopted are sufficiently
similar so that a "trend" regarding modern state land use
regulation can be identified.
The most predominant strain found in this legislation is the
requirement that new industrial developments obtain pre-construction certification. 12 Although states are not uniform in the types
of industrial facilities that are regulated nor in the the administrative criteria used in decision-making, they are interested in ensuring
governmental regulation prior to any substantial commitment of
resources. Often pre-construction certification is tied in with long
range planning, particularly in the case of electrical utilities which
and construction forecasts
may be required to submit consumption
13
for up to twenty years into the future.
Another common statutory scheme involves consolidating
administrative proceedings in an effort to simplify decision-making
procedures and eliminate duplication. Legislatures generally confer sufficient authority in one siting agency to ensure the primacy
9. As late as 1969, only 26 states required a certificate of public convenience and necessity prior to construction of electrical generating facilities. THE ENERGY POLICY STAFF, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 56 (1970). Thus public utility
commissions are often "deferring to the decisions of the utilities, who
base their decisions on cost, safety and maintenance factors and not
upon environmental concerns." Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra note

1, at 548-49.

10. 'This statement refers primarily to the regulation of electrical utilities.
See Best, supra note 6, at 674.
11. Among these states are New Hampshire, Connecticut, South Carolina,
Arizona, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington, Florida, Maine,
Maryland, New York, Vermont, Hawaii and Wyoming.
12. Best, supra note 6, at 669.
13. Requirements for long range plans for proposed facility development
vary from six years in Florida to twenty years in Connecticut. The
most commonly required time frame for long range planning is ten
years. REViEw DRAFT, supra note 5, at 3-10.
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of its decisions over those of other state and local governmental
agencies and thereby inject a degree of finality into the administrative process. For example, South Carolina achieves administrative
consolidation by requiring that certain specified state agencies that
have an interest in industrial siting be parties to the single certification proceeding before the state industrial certification agency.' 4
The final decision of the siting agency must incorporate those interagency recommendations and conditions deemed appropriate into
the specific industrial construction certification.' 5 No other license or agency approval is required once this certificate is
issued.' 6 Following this procedure results in consolidated decision-making and ensures administrative expediency and procedural
finality.
Despite the similarities in existing legislation there appears to
be no consistency among the several states regarding the physical
composition of the assorted agencies entrusted with industrial siting certification. A few have created an entirely new board or commission, sometimes composed of members with a broad range of
interests. 17 Several have delegated the responsibility to existing
state agencies such as the Public Service Commission' 8 or the
Secretary of Natural Resources. 19 And other states have established interagency industrial siting commissions consisting of the
administrative heads of existing state regulatory agencies. 20 Connecticut 2' has created a hybrid siting agency, which combines the
heads of existing state regulatory agencies with appointees from
the general public and members of the legislature; Oregon's siting
agency has only appointees from the general public; 22 and Florida
has delegated administration
of its land use act to the governor
23
and his cabinet.
In those states with comprehensive environmental programs
legislation has been enacted which sets forth specific criteria to be
considered by the industrial siting agency when reviewing a siting
application. While guidelines vary, they generally require consid14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-1813 (Supp. 1975).
15. Id. § 58-1815.
16. Id. § 58-1830.
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (Supp. 1973).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-1803, 58-1810 (Supp. 1975).
19.

MD. ANN. CODE, NATURAL RESOURCES,

§

3-301 (1974).

20. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-F:3 (Supp. 1975);
§ 80.50.030 (Supp. 1975).
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-50j (Supp. 1975).
22. ORE. REV. STAT. § 469.450 (1975).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.031 (1974).

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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eration of all environmental, economic, and health issues, as well
as historical, cultural and aesthetic impact. Maryland has enacted
the most comprehensive system for power plant site location, requiring that its public service commission promulgate a ten year prediction for state electrical consumption 24 and that the state acquire
title to not fewer than four appropriate site locations. For each
electric company generating 1000 MV or more of electricity, a
to be held in bank for lease or sale to the
minimum of one site is 25
electrical power facility.
A final trend found in most states with comprehensive legislation which is worth noting is that they allow full public participation in the decision-making process, usually in the form of public
hearings prior to the granting of an industrial site certification or
a development permit. Public notice requirements vary. Once a
is finalized most states allow administrative or judisiting decision
cial review.2 6
Most local and regional land use regulation exist primarily in
the form of zoning ordinances. However, they are inherently
deficient as a method of adequate land use regulation because zoning is a negative devise; it decrees what cannot be done rather than
what should be done. Zoning regulations are usually not promulgated in conjunction with a comprehensive community growth
plan: variances are often easily obtained by pressure from developers or from a "stacked" zoning board; 27 zoning regulations are
often compromised in favor of industrial development which broadens the local property tax base.28 Furthermore, the vast majority
of local zoning boards operate extemporaneously with a parochial
perspective and do not have the expertise nor the resources to make
complex environmental decisions.
CODE, NATURAL RESOURCES, § 3-304 (1974).
25. Id. § 3-305.
26. There is no uniformity among the various states on the question of

24. MD. ANN.

whether administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review is allowed. New Mexico allows judicial review regardless of
whether administrative review was sought, while Hawaii allows judicial review only after completion of the administrative review process.
Oregon has no administrative review; judicial review is direct. See

generally REVIEW DRAr, supranote 5, at 3-24 to 3-25.
27. This exists when the membership of the regulatory board has a disproportionate number of land developers or development interests.
BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. Monograph No. 20, at 11-12 (Nov. 8, 1974).

28. It has been reported that sixty-five per cent of all local revenue is
derived through property taxation. Id. at 13. Thus, small, rural, and
poor communities are especially susceptable to unrestricted land development as a means of broadening the tax base.
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III.

FEDERAL REGULATION

Federal environmental regulation has taken the form of legislation designed to regulate specific uses of the environment rather
than to promulgate a federal program of comprehensive land use
regulation and industrial site control. Congress appears content to
categorize industrial site regulation as an aspect of the larger
problem of land use control, which has traditionally been a matter
of local concern. Regulation and licensing of federal industrial
projects has been fragmented among various agencies in accordance
with several statutory arrangements for environmental regulation.
A.

National Environmental Policy Act

The single most important piece of federal environmental
legislation is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA"). 29 It seeks to implement a policy of environmental
awareness throughout the federal bureaucracy by directing that the
laws and policies of the United States be administered pursuant
to the specific goals set out in the Act. 30
NEPA requires that all federal agencies conduct a comprehensive environmental evaluation and prepare and file an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in conjunction with "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment .... ,,31 Integrated within this system is the
provision that all federal decision-makers review the EIS and consider all environmental consequences of and alternatives to the proposed federal action. The result is that under NEPA, federal
decision-making agencies must now balance environmental protection considerations with the overall desirability of the proposed
project, weighing resource allocation and environmental alternatives against the project's immediate and long range consequences.
Because of this, NEPA has prima facie applicability for industrial
projects.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
30.
Essentially, the policy declaration [of NEPA] states that
ways and means must be found whereby man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, that "each person should

enjoy a healthful environment," and that the national goal

should be a balance between population growth and resource
use in order to maintain a "high standard of living and a wide

sharing of life's amenities."
Rzmvw DRAFT, supra note 5, at 2-4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 (c), 4331 (b)
(5) (1970).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
B.

Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act 3 2 exemplifies fragmentary federal legislation
of narrow scope which can have a significant impact on industrial
siting. Its single purpose is maintaining air quality and this is
achieved primarily by the issuance of national ambient air quality
standards for individual air pollutants by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").33 Implementation and
enforcement of these air standards is delegated to the states under
the supervision of the EPA. These regulations can provide a back
door approach to industrial site regulation through a framework
of standards and controls within which a state regulatory system
can be defined. This can be accomplished by requiring new industrial projects to comply with34the Air Quality Act standards prior
to construction and operation.
C.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 197235
may have an impact on industrial siting by providing for regulation
of effluent discharges into all the navigable waters of the United
States. 3 6 EPA guidelines define navigable waters broadly enough
to include within the jurisdiction of the act almost any body of
water within or bordering the United States. 37 Generally speaking,
the act provides that the EPA promulgate effluent limitations with
pollution control and enforcement left to the states or to the relevant federal agency. 38 Thus, an applicant for industrial siting will
have to obtain an operational certification or discharge permit from
the appropriate state or federal agency prior to commencing opera32. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3, 1857c-4 (1970).
34. Currently, responsibility for assurances that industrial emissions wil
meet air quality standards falls on individual industries. Each new
industry may find compliance with clean air standards increasingly
difficult as new plants add to air pollution, moving air quality out
of compliance with the act.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. 1H, 1972).
37. Quailes, Jr., Memorandum, 3 BNA ENvioNvrNMENT REP., CUmENT DEVELOPMTNTS 1240 (Feb. 9, 1973).
38. The statute is designed to require the federal government to provide
grants-in-aid and water quality guidelines to the individual states for
development of water pollution control programs. If the states fail
either to develop a control program within federal guidelines or to
maintain the program once developed, the EPA has authority to assume jurisdiction. In water quality regulation of navigable waters
the Corps of Engineers may also have jurisdictional control. See note
44 and accompanying text supra.
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tions, certifying that the industrial project complies with water
quality standards.
D.

Noise Control Act

A fourth example of federal environmental legislation which
may influence industrial site selection is the Noise Control Act of
1972. 3 1 It does not provide for comprehensive noise abatement
regulation, but instead limits EPA jurisdiction to control of "new
product emissions" distributed in interstate commerce. The EPA
is to publish noise criteria and promulgate emission limitations for
individual source categories. Federal preemption exists in the control of new products, but state regulation of their use is allowed.
E.

Other Means of Federal Environmental Regulation

The federal statutes previously discussed all fall under the
administrative jurisdiction of the EPA. Other federal agencies,
however, possess environmental regulatory authority, and thus may
have an impact on industrial site selection. For example, the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 197240 gives the Department of Commerce the statutory authority to regulate coastal waters and
adjacent shorelands. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Commission has
exclusive authority to regulate production and use of nuclear fuels
and facilities. 41 Federal control of non-federal hydroelectric
power facilities on navigable waters is exercised by the Federal
Power Commission 42 under the authority of the Federal Power
Act. 43 Finally, the Corps of Engineers, acting under the authority
of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 4 4 has
regulatory authority over all construction within the high water
line of the navigable waters of the United States.
Several items of legislation currently pending before Congress
seek federal regulatory authority over land use control 45 and the
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. II, 1972).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1!72).

41. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (1970). The Commission also has the authority to
regulate hydroelectric developments on non-navigable waters on federal land.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. (1970).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
45. Several bills designed to establish a national land use policy are currently before Congress. The most notable is S.268, commonly referred
to as the Jackson Land Use Bill. On June 21, 1973 it passed the Senate, but later failed to be reported out of committee in the House.
119 CONG. REc. 20,631 (1973).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
siting of power generating facilities. 46 While discussion of the provision of each specific congressional bill is beyond the limited scope
of this article, the reader should be aware that legislation of this
nature is pending before Congress, and that enactment of some of
it appears likely within the next several years.
IV. THE ABA COMMITTEE REPORT
The report of the Special ABA Committee on Environmental
Law was promulgated in response to what the Committee considered to be inadequate and overlapping environmental decisionmaking at both federal and state levels regarding site selection of
industrial facilities with major environmental impact. The study
was specifically intended to make recommendations designed "to
improve regulatory procedures, to reduce unnecessary multiplicity
and over-lap of regulatory regimes, and to establish some point of
finality in the decision-making process. . .. ,,47 These goals were
framed within the broad objective of achieving environmental
quality.
The Committee prefaced its report with an appeal for implemen-

48
tation of statewide planning to regulate general land use.

It

recommended that land use regulation be a continuing process, with
local and regional authorities being responsible for local land use
control. In areas of critical state concern state interests would be
superior. Land use regulation would have two aspects: regulatory
control (zoning), which would be rigid and not readily amendable,
and resource allocation (basic planning) 49 which would be highly
flexible to meet changing demands. The Committee regarded land
use planning as the basis for any valid consideration of specific
46. The most important electrical power siting bill is S. 935, which is designed to assure protection of environmental values while facilitating
construction of needed electrical power supply facilities.
For a general summary of all pending congressional legislation, see
REviEw DRArT, supra note 5, at 2-41 to 2-52.
47. REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
48. The Report made it clear that land use planning was not a specific
topic of the final report, and thus did not feel obligated to recommend
legislative reform of general land use mechanisms. However, the
Committee recognized the importance of basic planning in any statutory scheme for industrial siting, and for this reason included a brief
discussion of land use planning in the final report. See REPoRT, supra
note 4, at 29.
49. Basic planning was defined as "a general but flexible plan for the
allocation and use of air, water, land, minerals and other natural resources.

. . ."

Id.
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industrial demands upon the environment: defective planning
would only magnify subsequent environmental conflicts. 0
To better facilitate site selection in relation to environmental
values and industrial needs, the ABA Special Committee recommended specific governmental agency reform at the state, federal
and federal-state levels. Due to the wide variety of statutory programs presently existing at the state level,5 1 the proposed state
reforms were not directed toward solving any particular administrative deficiencies, but were intended merely to illustrate existing
problems. The Committee's proposals, therefore, involve a generally
defined "ideal" recommended administrative framework, which
could be applied to the existing statutory system of each state.
The Committee suggested that substantive administrative
reform at the state level be based on a new and independent state
agency to be called the Industrial Siting Council ("ISC"). 52 This
"super-agency" would have broad jurisdiction over all siting applications of major industrial facilities within the state and responsibility for resolving all environmental and developmental conflicts
in a "one-stop" administrative proceeding. 53
The Report made it clear that in some states the demand for
broad institutional modification is not as great as in others. For
example, states with currently existing comprehensive environmental and land use legislation 54 could satisfy Committee recommendations with a simple reorganization of existing agencies. Thus,
responsibility for industrial siting might fall on a modified state
planning agency, natural resources department, or environmental
quality council.5 5 However, in the majority of states where scant
50. Id. The Report, however, did not go so far as to require absolutely
that basic land use planning be a prerequisite to industrial site
selection. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 6-25 and accompanying text supra.
52. The Committee conceded that the name Industrial Siting Council may
not be entirely satisfactory and that the entity just as easily could
be referred to as the Environmental Review Council, or something
else. RF 'Oar, supra note 4, at 42.
53. The Committee stated these reasons for requiring 'aconsolidated onestop administrative proceeding:
In some States there are virtually no requirements for
environmental evaluation, while other states require repetitious and overlapping procedures and hearings ....
If responsibility for environmental evaluation and decision-making
were to be placed within a single agency, the decision-making
process would be expedited and all environmental values
could be considered.
Id. at 5.
54. See notes 11-25 and accompanying text, supra.
55. Thus the composition of the "single state agency" would vary from

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
environmental regulation currently exists, the creation of a new,
independent siting agency would be required.
The Committee recommended that the ISC have inclusively
broad jurisdiction over all industrial siting applications of major
facilities. 50 This would ensure that specific land development and
industrial facility construction would not escape regulation because
of underinclusiveness and that projects posing insignificant environmental threat would not require regulation because of overinclusiveness. Specific exemptions from ISC jurisdiction could be implemented by legislative fiat or by administrative order on a case-bycase basis.57

The ISC would have sole responsibility for conducting an
environmental evaluation and site assessment and for considering
the desirability of the particular industrial development in view
of the overall public interest. ISC decision-making would preempt
the regulatory authority of all local and state agencies. 58 This
broad authority would provide for one-stop certification of all
industrial siting applications and the consolidation of the decisionmaking process into one body with statewide responsibilities. 59
state to state in relation to existing statutory institutions. It was for
this reason that the Committee chose to keep its recommendations general, rather than to propose a '"model" or "uniform" industrial siting
act. REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
56. The Report used "facilities" broadly to include "all development in
areas of critical state concern, and ... all other non-residential construction or development. . .

."

Id. at 57 (emphasis in original). Thus

ISC jurisdiction would cover the siting of such major developments
as condominiums, apartment houses, and office buildings, as well as

power plants, factories, and other industrial undertakings. The Report
specified, however, that -the basic concern of the Committee regarding
ISC jurisdiction was "major manufacturing, processing, or distributing
facilities which pose a serious, significant, or substantial threat to the
environment.. ." Id. at 58.
57. With broadly defined jurisdiction, ISC could, at its discretion, deny
administrative jurisdiction whenever it concluded that the project under consideration would pose no serious environmental threat. In
cases where ISC jurisdiction was denied, regulation and certification
would be left to the usual individual state regulatory agencies. Id.
at 57-58.
58. Preemption would apply both to factual determinations (violation of
basic environmental standards) as well as to policy considerations
(granting of variances). Id. at 48.
59. The Committee outlined three specific justifications for ISC preemption of local and state agency decision-making: (1) it could be vested
with authority to make decisions pursuant to a statewide public interest; (2) it could best balance all environmental issues (bio-physical,
social, cultural and economic); (3) preemption would make possible
a consolidated proceeding. Id.
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Although the ISC would have authority to preempt local and
state environmental regulation, it would be required to consider
all local and state interests as represented before the council. The
Committee recommended the promulgation of legislation requiring
those agencies normally entrusted with certification jurisdiction
over the industrial project to participate in the decision-making
process by presenting recommendations to the ISC. 0° Furthermore, local and statewide land use and zoning ordinances would
be adhered to by the ISC unless superceded by specifically enumerated state policy considerations. A local or state environmental
regulation could be overridden by variance only if the agency
which normally had jurisdiction had the power to grant such a
variance and variance was in the best public interest; however,
minimum environmental and health standards would not be subject
to variance.
In making its environmental assessment, the Committee proposed that the ISC be required to consider within the scope of its
study not only bio-physical factors, but also social, cultural and economic considerations. Furthermore, it should be guided by specific
legislative criteria which define the public interest, identify
values and give them priority. 61
The Report recommended that the ISC be composed of five
independent, experienced and objective members generally familiar
with the environment and industrial development. The Council
members should be adequately suited to represent the overall public good in industrial siting and should6 2 be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the legislature.
60. The Report proposed that the state and local agencies which, except
for ISC preemption, would have jurisdiction over various certification
aspects of the industrial siting, be designated "action agencies." These
action agencies would be required to conduct an administrative review
of the proposed industrial siting and to report their conclusions and
recommendations to the ISC. The action agency, however, would not
perform a balancing function but would be responsible for licensing
and enforcement of environmental regulations within its jurisdiction
upon siting approval by the ISC. Id. at 46-47.
61. The Committee promulgated a list of sample criteria suitable as legislative guidelines for the ISC balancing decision. Id. at 12-14.
62. The Report also briefly discussed three alternative methods to compose the ISC: (1) a hybrid agency composed of the heads of existing
state agencies which had any interest in industrial site selection; (2) a
composition of representatives of industry and environmental groups;
(3) a modification of an existing state agency to handle ISC responsibilities. The Report found general disadvantages in all three alterna-

tives, and, therefore, recommended the creation of a new and independent siting agency. The duties of the ISC were felt to be of such
significance that its objectives should not be compromised by anything

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Procedurally, it was suggested that the ISC have exclusive
responsibility for conducting the environmental evaluation of the
proposed industrial development and for making the final environmental balancing decision. The watchwords of all proceedings
before the ISC would be openness and informality, which would
in turn promote maximum public participation.
Once ISC jurisdiction were established, the ISC staff would prepare a preliminary environmental study design and budget. 63 With
the results of this, 6 4 plus input by all interested parties and the
guidance of legislative criteria, 65 the staff would next prepare a
draft environmental impact statement. After another series of
public hearings, it would promulgate and submit to the ISC the
final environmental impact statement along with staff recommendations regarding the industrial siting application."
If no material disputes remained upon submission of the final
environmental impact statement to the ISC, a final decision would
be immediately rendered. However, if material disputes over the
environmental impact of the industrial siting continued to exist,
the ISC would have to conduct a formal adjudicatory-type hearing
on the record allowing full public participation.6 7 The administrative decision of the ISC would be subject to judicial review by the
highest court of the state, although only those persons who participated in the formal proceeding before the ISC would have standing
to initiate appeal. Collateral attack would be barred.
At the federal level, 68 the ABA Special Committee recommended the creation of an independent governmental agency which
would review industrial siting decisions made by other independent

63.

64.

65.
66.

67.
68.

short of a completely independent and objective composition. Id. at
44-45.
The budget is intended to predict the agency cost of conducting the
environmental impact study. These agency study costs would be
paid by the applicant through a variable siting application fee. Id.
at 63-64.
The Committee suggested that the environmental study for each individual project be conducted over a period of one to two years. This
would allow in-depth study of the industrial site over all seasons of
the year. Id. at 67-68.
See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
It is at this point that the ISC itself first participates in the decisionmaking process. The Committee determined that maximum objectivity could be best achieved by restraining full ISC participation until
the final decision-making process. REPORT, supra note 4, at 70-1.
All prior hearings would be informal legislative-type hearings before
the ISC staff.
"Federal level" is used in this context to denote the preemptive scope
of federal environmental regulation in areas of federal concern.

454

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 3 (1976)

federal agencies.0 9 Among the problems this proposed administrative arrangement seeks to remedy are: the overlapping authority
between federal agencies; lack of complete objectivity in internal
decision review; lack of jurisdiction of some existing agencies to
authorize alternative construction; 70 inadequate staffing and funding; and the limited jurisdiction of some agencies over specific parts
of the overall industrial project.
The Report suggested that current federal administrative procedures be revised to designate as "lead agency" the federal licensing
agency with primary jurisdiction over the industrial siting application. 71 This agency would prepare the environmental impact
statement and would make the final environmental balancing decision. Other interested federal agencies would be subordinate in the
sense that they would not be involved in the balancing process but
would only have licensing authority within the parameters of existing environmental quality standards. Thus, only one balancing
decision would be made in each construction application.
The independent review agency would have jurisdiction to hear
administrative appeals from the decision of the lead agency and
could substitute its decisions for those of a lower federal agency,
even where no balancing function was performed. It would
examine the application de novo and make its decision on the basis
having
of administrative criteria followed by the federal agencies
72
jurisdiction, with full participation by the agency staffs.
69. Federal administrative reform proposals were based on two underlying assumptions. First, the Committee concluded that specific legislative reform was best left to Congress, and, therefore, its recommendations were general in nature and intended merely to illustrate the deficiencies of existing federal institutions. Second, the report recognized that sweeping reform was not necessary at the federal level since
comprehensive federal environmental legislation already existed, and
federal agencies were experienced in environmental decision-making.
REPORT, supra note 4, at 76-77.
70. For example, the Atomic Energy Commission presently possesses preemptive federal authority to license nuclear power facility construction, yet cannot license alternate forms of power generation in the
event that nuclear generation proves unfeasible or undesirable.
71. As an illustration, the Federal Power Commission would be the designated "lead agency" in siting decisions involving hydroelectric generating plant construction since that agency has primary statutory authority to regulate hydroelectric facilities. The same analysis would
apply to the Atomic Energy Commission regarding licensing of nuclear
power generating facilities.
72. The federal review agency should be required to consider all relevant
issues, including such nonenvironmental factors as economics, safety
and antitrust implications, REPORT, supra note 4, at 80-1.
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The Committee felt that this administrative arrangement would
have three advantages over existing industrial siting procedures.
First, this program would provide for a single form administrative
hearing and would avoid unnecessary duplication. Second, it would
vest final decision-making authority in an agency with the power
to authorize construction alternatives. Third, the proposed arrangement would ensure complete objectivity by insulating the
reviewing agency from preliminary licensing decisions.
All public hearings before the lead agency and other interested
73
federal agencies would be informal legislative-type hearings.
However, the hearing before the review agency would be formal,
adjudicatory and on the record. At all levels full public participation would be allowed. Judicial appeal of the administrative review
agency's final decision would be to the federal court of appeals. 74
The Committee recommended that the independent review
agency have a physical composition similar to that of the state
ISC. 75 Appointment would be made by the President with the
advice of the Senate and each individual would have a term of ten
years.
Recognizing that many industrial siting questions involve both
federal and state licensing and regulation 7 6 the ABA Committee
report briefly touched upon legislative reform at the federal-state
level. It recommended that general land use regulation be left to
state and local government with Congress enumerating those facilifor which there should be
ties of paramount national concern
77
federal industrial siting preemption.
73.

Currently, Section 5 of the Administrative Procedures Act requires
that hearings before such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission
and Federal Power Commission be adjudicatory in nature. Adoption of the Committee Report would necessitate amending these requirements.

74. As with proceedings at the state level, judicial appeal could be initiated only by those who participated in the formal hearing before the
federal review agency, and collateral attack would be barred. See
note 67 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
76. In many cases of industrial siting there is overlapping federal and
state environmental regulation. For example, the Atomic Energy Act
gives the federal government preemptive regulatory authority over
nuclear power plant construction. However, state environmental regulation may also be applicable in the form of water resource regulation, building codes, zoning ordinances, and land use planning control.
77. The Committee gave the following examples of facilities of paramount
national concern for which federal preemption could apply: nuclear
power plants, large oil refineries, and offshore tanker ports. REPORT,
supra note 4, at 86.

456

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 3 (1976)

In cases where federal and state jurisdiction were co-extensive
and no federal preemption existed, the Committee made no specific
recommendations but acknowledged the need for legislation
to remedy unnecessary administrative duplication.
It summarily listed three methods which state and federal governments
could study as means to consolidate administrative decision-making: (1) the creation of joint federal-state entities, either on a
permanent or an ad hoc basis; (2) federal review of state environmental decisions; or (3) the enactment of reciprocal congressional
78
and state legislation.
Although not included as a part of the final Committee report,
the review draft had discussed in some detail the proposal for enactment of reciprocal legislation at the federal-state level.7 9 It proposed legislation which would eliminate federal-state duplication
and provide for one-stop decision-making. This would be accomplished by giving the appropriate federal agency initial authority
to screen all construction siting applications to determine whether
federal preemption existed, and if so, whether it should be exercised. If the federal question were minor and state and local issues
remained, jurisdiction would be passed to the state ISC. Normal
ISC decision-making procedure would than apply, with full participation by all interested state and federal agencies. The state siting
decision would be binding upon the federal government.
V. DISCUSSION
The single most important aspect of the Committee Report is
its recognition of the need for comprehensive administrative decision-making for industrial site selection. To satisfy this need, the
Committee recommended the establishment of an independent
agency at both the federal and state level which would consolidate
both procedure and decision-making. The responsibility for balancing competing environmental interests on a scale weighted by statutory criteria would thus be delegated to a single agency, assuring
the efficient implementation of programs and policies pursuant to
the public interest. 80 Preemption of other regulatory agencies
would ensure economy of procedure through one-stop decisionmaking.8
Finally, by broadly defining the certification jurisdic78. Id.

79. Rzvmw DRArr, supra note 5, at 5-48 to 5-54.
80. The inherent dangers of consolidated decision-making are also apparent. Failure to ensure objectivity of the siting agency, either through
legislative negligence in drafting agency guidelines, or less than judicious administrative appointments, may serve to defeat the goal of
decision-making in the public interest.
81. Many commentators have advocated one-stop decision-making in in-
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tion of the industrial siting agency overlapping jurisdiction would
be eliminated and the administrative superiority of the independent
agency would be established, subject only to legislative exception.
As recognized by the Committee Report,8 2 judicious decisionmaking which serves "the best public interest" is achieved through
maximum objectivity. The Report guarantees the maintenance of
objectivity in industrial siting decisions by providing for the siting
agency's complete administrative independence. Decision-making
by the siting board would be by first impression with the board
itself having no responsibility for either background research or
promulgation of the EIS. s 3 Furthermore, the agency would have
no promotional duties nor would it supervise construction or
enforcement.8 4 Bias on both the personal and agency levels would,
therefore, be eliminated. Agency discretion would be limited only
by the promulgation of comprehensive legislative guidelines defining the public interest and giving priority to general environmental
values.
The scope of the environmental balancing decision made by the
independent siting agency is broadly defined to include not only
bio-physical environmental aspects, but also social, cultural and economic issues. The directive to consider these factors is significant
because traditionally environmental evaluation has dealt primarily
dustrial licensing and site selection. See generally THE ENERGY PomcY
STAFF, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AMN THE
ENVIRONMENT (1970); Baram, Environmental Decision-Making and
the Siting of Facilities,5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50089 (1975); Cavers,
Administrative Decisionmaking in Nuclear Facilities Licensing, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 330 (1962); Stone, Power Siting: A Challenge to the Legal
Process, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1971); Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra
note 1; Comment, Environmental Land-Use Control: Common Law
and Statutory Approaches, 28 U. MmiAM L. REV. 135 (1973); 47 IND.
L.J. 742 (1972).
82. REPORT, supra note 4, at 45, 71.
83. All the preliminary administrative procedures, including research,
drafting of the EIS and conducting draft review hearings would be
the ISC staff's responsibility. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text
supra.
84. A major criticism of existing environmental regulatory agencies is that
they are administratively biased because they are responsible for both
promotion and regulation of industry development. Specific criticism
has been leveled at the Atomic Energy Commission alleging that the
Commissioners' dual role as supervisors of both regulation and research and development implies a lack of objectivity. Tarlock, Tippy
& Francis, supra note 1, at 523 n.91. See also Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical View, 43 NOTRE DA vM
L. REV. 633 (1968); Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No-Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 ATOMIC
ENERGY L.J. 1 (1971).
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with the immediate biological ramifications of industrial pollution
in relation to economic benefits, rather than a balancing of the
"overall" ecological costs and benefits. This aspect of the Committee Report exemplifies a total commitment to the consideration of
long range environmental interests as opposed to short term
economic benefits. 85
Also, illustrative of the Committee's commitment to long range
environmental interests is its recognition of the need for statewide
land use planning. Few states now have a program of comprehensive land use control, thus compounding the conflict between
environmental considerations and substantially unrestricted land
development. Site assessment without reference to a general land
use plan tends to evaluate only the environmental impact on or
near the proposed industrial site, whereas assessment that is influenced by land use planning would allow consideration of broader
social and environmental values on a regional or statewide basis.
This interdependence of land use planning and industrial site control necessarily confirms the Committee's general position that
implementation of any program of regulated industrial siting should
be contemporaneous with the creation of a system of comprehensive
land use control.8
Finally, the Committee Report demonstrates a strong commitment to complete public participation at all levels of the
administrative process. Public notice of all applications for industrial siting certification is required, as well as publication and distribution of the pertinent EIS. Open hearings before governmental
regulatory agencies and the ISC staff would be kept informal so
as to encourage full public participation. Also, the appropriate
environmental review agency would be required to hear all public
comment in a formal proceeding and would have to give adequate
consideration to such input when making its balancing decision.
Open proceedings with complete public participation is a necessary
first step toward ensuring balanced decision-making in the overall
public interest.
Despite these areas where the Committee's proposals are praiseworthy, there are several others which merit a critical review. The
85. Additional evidence of the Committee's commitment to long range environmental interests is its proposal that industrial projects with "significant" environmental impact provide advance notice of application
to the ISC of between two and twenty years in order to allow "lead
time" for public discussion of the proposed project. REPORT, supra note
4, at 62.
86. For further discussion see note 97 and accompanying text infra.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
general difficulty with the Committee Report is its unstated, yet
apparent, assumption that land use and industrial site selection
issues are of such primary importance to the general public and
their legislative representatives that resolution of these problems
should tend to override the process of site selection for all future
land uses in general, even to the point of establishing a separate
governmental agency for such selection. However, states with
existing comprehensive environmental legislation will tend to resist
broad legislative revision which will only add but another layer
to the administrative bureaucracy, while those with no existing
administrative framework for environmental regulation may balk
at a recommendation for broad bureaucratic expansion and corresponding fiscal expenditure.8 7 This is a conceptual problem, and
has no solution since the fault lies primarily with human nature.
A recommendation for institutional reform that occurs within the
framework of existing state agencies appears to be a partial solution, since it would allow easy and relatively inexpensive implementation of industrial8 8siting procedures within an existing administrative framework.
The recommendations made by the Committee Report for agency
reform at the federal level are also not altogether satisfactory. The
Report generally outlined three justifications for federal administrative reform: (1) to ensure independence and objectivity of the
decision-maker; (2) to provide for administrative review; and (3)
to vest in the decision-maker authority to make positive decisions
on alternative proposals which agencies of limited jurisdiction may
be powerless to do."" To achieve these goals, it was recommended
that an independent review agency with jurisdiction to review de
novo the environmental decision-making of lower federal lead agencies be created.
This process seems complicated, especially when viewed in light
of the Report's underlying objective which is to remedy adminis0
trative duplication and procedural delayY A more expeditious
87. States with no existing program for state-wide land use planning or
industrial site selection would be required, under the Committee recommendations, to create two new administrative agencies-a state
planning board and an ISC. This probably would require much costly
state administrative reform.
88. The Committee Report briefly discussed, but did not recommend, alternative ISC compositions which could be adapted more easily to
present state statutory arrangements. See note 62 and accompanying
text supra.
89. REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-8.
90. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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reform proposal and one which would not compromise basic values
would be a plan to revise the industrial siting procedure within
the existing federal administrative structure, without creating a
new overlapping federal siting agency. One-step decision-making
and procedural consolidation could be achieved by assigning to the
federal "lead agency" on an ad hoc basis administrative powers
1
similar to that of the proposed state ISC.Y
A single adjudicatory
hearing would be held by the lead agency in which all interested
federal licensing and regulatory agencies would be required to participate and report their recommendations. At this administrative
hearing all environmental issues including alternative proposals
would be resolved. 92 Independence and objectivity could be assurred by requiring adherence to specific congressional guidelines
defining national environmental policy values. This alternative
administrative arrangement would preserve the idealistic goals of
the Committee Report while requiring only relatively modest
administrative modification within the existing bureaucracy.
There are also problems in the Committee recommendation
that the ISC have discretionary preemptive authority over local and
regional land use regulation. It was proposed that the ISC be
required to incorporate into its balancing decision local and regional
land use plans and ordinances, except where it determined that the
public interest would be better served by departing from the provisions of local regulation. Such a departure would be justified
only by specific public interest considerations. 3
This procedure for preemption of local land use regulation poses
a serious threat to local sovereignty and individual property interests. The term "public interest" not only involves overall state
environmental and industrial interests, but also implies protection
of local land use and property rights. Local regulation of property
and its uses is the base upon which a comprehensive system of land
use should be founded. Providing for easy amendment of local
regulatory criteria serves only to undermine the entire system.
91. The "lead agency" would be the federal agency with primary regulatory jurisdiction over the proposed industrial project. Under this alternative proposal, the agency would be vested with authority to consolidate all regulatory and procedural aspects of the siting process,
and would be responsible for drafting the EIS and for making the
final environmental balancing decision.
92. Because all interested federal agencies would participate in the final
adjudicatory hearing, one-stop decision-making would be preserved in
situations where alternative development is desirable by transferring
regulatory jurisdiction to the appropriate participating agency.
93. REPoRT, supra note 4, at 7-8. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text

supra.
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The public interest is defined by the Committee Report as "the
greatest net benefit to the public. '94 There are situations where
this policy of utilitarianism could easily be used so that the outstanding cumulative benefit to a populous urban community already polluted to the tolerable limit would prey upon the relatively
minor cumulative harm that the siting of an industrial polluter
would have on a pristine rural environment.9 5 Under the Committee criteria, rural siting could be authorized even though the rural
community derived no overall benefit from the proposed development, and in fact, suffered some degree of harm.
The solution to this problem is to draw a compromise between
the sanctity of local land use regulation and the need for state preemption in justifiable circumstances. Before the state could preempt local or regional land use regulation, it should be required
to establish that there is an overriding or compelling state interest
in the proposed development, or that local interests will be the
primary beneficiaries of the development. This standard would
protect the relative security of local property interests from arbitrary state action and would allow the state a sure method of regulation in the proper circumstances. The procedure should not, of
course, be used only to allow development; the state should also
have the authority to promulgate protective state land use regulation for specific land areas and to deny industrial development in
areas that are locally regulated whenever a compelling state interest is demonstrated.9 6
Another problem area in the Committee Report is its failure to
require basic land use planning as an absolute prerequisite to industrial site selection. 97 Ideally, land use planning and industrial site
94. REPORT, supra note 4, at 68.
95. A hypothetical example of potential administrative abuse would be
siting a coal-burning electrical power generating plant, designed to
supply power exclusively to a distant urban area, in a rural area relatively free from industrial air pollution. The rural area would derive
little direct benefit from the development other than a few new jobs
and an increased tax base but probably would suffer substantial environmental and aesthetic harm.
96. Legislative criteria should be promulgated outlining specific land uses
for which there should be overriding statewide land use regulation.
Possible land uses of state-wide concern are those involving navigation, pollution, electrical power and communcations.
97. The Committee recommendations for legislative reform to facilitate
industrial site selection were premised on the assumption that a basic
statewide land use plan should be promulgated contemporaneously
with the creation of an industrial siting agency. However, although
recognizing that the establishment of a basic plan would take several
years (the Committee suggested a maximum of five years), the Committee nonetheless proposed that the industrial siting council be made
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selection are two parts of a larger holistic process. Planning on
a broad scale permits the gross assessment of the cumulative impact
of land uses in various locations and-delineates the necessary infrastructure to support such uses. Site assessment confirms or
reverses determinations with respect to a particular location and
facilitates detailed design regulation appropriate to the particular
industrial site. Basic land use planning and industrial site selection
are inherently interdependent; industrial siting without reference
to basic planning necessarily means arbitrary decision-making. For
these reasons, industrial site selection on a broad scale should not
precede the promulgation of a basic land use plan.
The Committee Report also failed to recognize the importance
of private long range industrial planning in the total scheme of
land use planning and industrial site selection. Although private
industry is not necessarily linked to the independent state or federal
industrial siting agency for supervision, it should be required to
assess long range consumer demands and predict corresponding
future industrial expansion. This prediction, which should be the
most accurate one available from an esoteric point of view, should
be submitted to the appropriate state agency for integration into
the basic land use plan.
Finally, the report does not specify whether industrial expansion of existing facilities which results in significant environmental
impact should be regulated by an industrial siting agency. It
speaks in general terms and thereby impliedly provides siting jurisdiction only for applications to construct new industrial facilities.
Expansion of an existing facility potentially poses the same environmental impact as construction of a new facility and deserves
similar regulatory treatment. Furthermore, post-licensing modification of construction plans should require reapplication to the
industrial siting agency for a new evaluation of the environmental
impact of the modified industrial development. These features are
missing from the Committee Report and should not be overlooked.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Discussion of the ABA Committee Report in relation to currently existing statutory structures for industrial site selection
leads to the conclusion that there is a great need for legislative
reform along broad social and ecological guidelines. In general, the
Report is commendable because it substantially achieves its primary
objective of proposing a system of legislative reform at both the
federal and state levels of government designed to facilitate more
operational immediately and function for several years without the
guidance of a basic land use plan. REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
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adequately the siting of industrial developments which have significant environmental impact. It is not a proposal for model legislation, but rather identifies the failures of current administrative
procedures and proposes specific legislative remedies which can be
accomplished by amending the present statutory structure of the
individual governmental body.
Despite its strong points, the Report does have its deficiencies.
However, when they are balanced against the need for legislative
reform and when one considers the adequacy of the Report in
general to satisfy this need, these deficiencies appear minor or at
least reparable. Nonetheless, they deserve close attention by judicious legislative bodies, as does the entire -Report. Nationwide
adoption of the Committee proposals will not solve this country's
enormous environmental problems but will certainly serve to facilitate the wise use of man's environment as it relates to the ever
increasing demands for both economic development and enviromental preservation.
James Nearhood '76

